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The past is but the beginning of a beginning, and all that is and 
has been is but the twilight of the dawn. 
H. G. Wells (1901) 
The rise of retirement began,  not with Medicare or the beginning  of Social 
Security, but more than a century ago. In 1880 the majority of men older than 
sixty-four toiled in the labor force. That proportion fell steadily and continu- 
ously, and today men older than sixty-four in the labor force are in the minority. 
More recently, participation rates among younger men, those aged fifty-five to 
sixty-four, have been falling as well. At the same time that the age of retirement 
has fallen, life expectancy has risen, and the average number of years spent in 
retirement has increased. If  present trends continue, those aged twenty today 
can expect to spend up to a third of their lives in retirement (Lee 1996). 
The rise of retirement was already documented by  the social reformers of 
the 1920s and 1930s (e.g., U.S. Committee on Economic Security 1935) and 
is familiar to many researchers. These researchers generally agree on the trend 
in retirement rates but disagree on explanations, citing both factors that have 
enticed men out of the labor force, such as the growth of Social Security, pri- 
vate pension plans, and income, and factors that have driven them out, such as 
sectoral shifts in the composition of the labor force, poor job opportunities, 
and ill health. In this chapter I first reexamine trends in the retirement of older 
men by individual characteristics (e.g., age, foreign birth, race, and residence) 
to provide insight into the rise of retirement. I then review explanations, ending 
with a discussion of how for many individuals retirement has evolved to be- 
come a recreation-filled life stage. 
2.1  Retirement Trends 
The term retirement generally connotes a complete  and permanent  with- 
drawal from paid labor, and entering retirement is often thought of as an abrupt 
change in the life of an elderly person. This conception of retirement accu- 
rately reflects the experience of most men today. Although some men do switch 
6 7  The Evolution of Retirement 
to part-time work at the end of their careers (Fuchs 1982; Ruhm 1990), about 
75 percent of  all retirement sequences today are transitions from a full-time 
job to being out of the labor force (Rust 1990). But we cannot be certain that 
defining retirement as a departure from paid labor, regardless of the number of 
hours worked, captures the meaning that the term had in the past. In the past 
men may have been more likely to phase work out of their lives slowly. Histori- 
ans of New England colonial economies found that older property owners re- 
mained closely involved in farming or preindustrial enterprises, supervising 
the family members and others who provided the labor supply (e.g., Fischer 
1977). The continued importance of farming and of artisanal enterprises to the 
American economy may  have  allowed owners to reduce hours of  work and 
continue to operate their enterprises with the help of family members and hired 
labor. Nonetheless, the labor force participation rate is perhaps the best simple 
indicator of economic activity by the elderly. 
Readily calculated from census data, the labor force participation rate states 
whether the elderly as a group are more likely to be consumers than producers. 
Although changing definitions of  labor force attachment obscure its precise 
meaning, most historical work is based on the concept of “gainful” employ- 
ment. This construct measures the proportion of individuals who claim to have 
had an occupation in the year before the census was taken. The current defini- 
tion of  labor force, initiated in  1940, depends, not on whether an individual 
had an occupation, but instead on whether an individual either worked for pay 
or sought employment during the survey week. 
It is still possible to construct a consistent series of labor force participation 
rates on the basis of the construct gainful employment because one of the new 
questions that the census enumerators began to ask in 1940 was about employ- 
ment and occupation in the past year. Participation rates can therefore be calcu- 
lated for anyone who claimed to have had an occupation in the past year. Moen 
(1987) used this procedure to construct a labor force participation series for 
men aged sixty-five and over from 1860 to 1980, and I extend his series back- 
ward to 1850 and forward to 1990. I also calculate a labor force participation 
series for men aged fifty-five to sixty-four for every year in which machine- 
readable census samples are available. Figure 2.1 shows that, among men older 
than sixty-four, participation rates fell steadily, from 78 percent in 1880 to 65 
percent in 1900. By 1930 the figure had dropped to 58 percent andin 1990 to 
less than 20 percent. Among men aged fifty-five to sixty-four the decline from 
a peak of 95 percent in  1880 was  somewhat less precipitous, falling to 82 
percent in 1940 and 67 percent in 1990. Although the series based on the con- 
cept of gainful employment yields participation rates that are somewhat higher 
than  those  calculated under  the  current definition, both  series exhibit the 
same patterns. 
Questions have been raised about the estimation of labor force participation 
rates prior to 1940. Directions to the enumerators were often ambiguous and 
are open to different interpretations. Ransom and Sutch (1986) presented esti- 8  Chapter2 
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Nore: The series for men aged sixty-five or over calculated under the concept of gainful employ- 
ment is Moen's (1987) series extended backward to 1850 and forward to 1990 using the integrated 
public-use census samples (Ruggles and Sobek 1995). The series for men aged sixty-five or over 
based on the current definition of the labor force is from Series D 29-41 in U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (1975, 132) and from table 622 in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993). The series for men 
aged fifty-five to sixty-four were estimated from the integrated public-use census samples (Rug- 
gles and Sobek 1995). 
mates of  labor force participation rates for men  aged sixty or older for the 
period 1870-1900 that show no decline in male labor force participation rates 
until the institution of Social Security in  1935. Their estimates hinge on the 
argument that men who reported six or more months of unemployment in 1900 
were retired and have been mistakenly classified as labor force participants. 
This view has been rejected by  a statistical comparison of the characteristics 
of  the retired with those of  older men who reported six or more months of 
unemployment (Margo 1993), implying that the series presented in figure 2.1 
accurately portray changes in the economic role of the elderly. 
The United States was not the only country to experience declining labor 
force participation rates of men older than sixty-four since the end of the nine- 
teenth century. Figure 2.2 shows that the U.S., British, French, and German 
series all follow the same long-term trend. Although the definition of the labor 
force also changed in Europe, the British series was compiled under a consis- 
tent definition because the British continued to collect data under both old 
and new  definitions. The early participation rates in the French series were 
reestimated using the contemporary definition. The German series, estimated 
neither under a consistent definition nor for a consistent age group, provides a 
rougher indication of the true trend but nonetheless exhibits the same pattern. 
Among men aged fifty to sixty-four, the trends in the United States, Britain, 
France, and Germany are similar as well, evincing a marked decline after 1970 
(see Johnson and Falkingham  1992, 90-91).  The similarities in these series 9  The Evolution of Retirement 
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Fig. 2.2  Labor force participation rates of men aged sixty-five and over, 
1850-1990,  United States, Britain, France, and Germany 
Note:  Participation rates for the United States are from Moen (1987) extended backward to 1850 
and forward to 1990 using the integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles and Sobek 1995). 
Participation rates for Great Britain are from Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982). and 
those for France are from Marchand (1991). Those for Germany for 1925 and later are from Ja- 
cobs, Kohli, and Rein (1991). German participation rates for 1882, 1895, and 1907 are Conrad’s 
(1990) estimates based on participation rates for men aged sixty to sixty-nine and seventy or older. 
suggest that an analysis of the factors that fostered high retirement rates in the 
United States can explain, not just the rise of American retirement, but also 
that of European. 
Labor force participation rates fell for Americans of  all backgrounds. Al- 
though participation rates have always been higher among native-born whites 
compared to the foreign born, participation rates have fallen for both groups 
(see fig. 2.3). As seen in figure 2.4, black participation rates have  fallen as 
well, with an especially sharp decline since 1920. Black men had much higher 
participation rates than white men from 1880 to 1950. The lifetime earnings 
of black men were much lower than those of whites, and they therefore would 
not have been able to save much money for their retirement. When the gap 
between white and black earnings began to narrow sharply after 1940, differ- 
ences in participation rates at older ages narrowed as well. By  1960 white 
participation rates began to exceed those of black men, perhaps because the 
earnings opportunities of black men relative to Social Security retirement or 
disability payments were lower than those of whites. 
2.2  The Timing of Retirement 
Age sixty-five now marks the beginning of “old age.” Participation rates of 
elderly males, for example, traditionally are given as those of men age sixty- 
five or over. This convention is largely due to the formulation of Social Security oNative Born 
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Fig. 2.3  Labor force participation rates of white men aged 65 and over by 
nativity, 1880-1990 
Note: Participation  rates were calculated using the concept of gainful employment. 
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Nore: Participation  rates were calculated using the concept of  gainful employment. 
Labor force participation rates of men aged 65 and over by race, 11  The Evolution of Retirement 
by  the Commission on Economic Security. The Commission decided in 1934 
that age sixty-five should be that of retirement, rejecting on financial grounds 
suggestions that the retirement age be below sixty-five and rejecting, as well, 
suggestions that it be above sixty-five to ensure congressional and public sup- 
port for old-age pensions in a period of high unemployment. But the use of 
sixty-five as the age of retirement has a long history and was not an invention 
of the Commission on Economic Security. After becoming synonymous with 
work incapacity in Bismarck’s Germany in 1883, it was adopted as a retirement 
age in the United States. In 1890, the Pension Bureau began to grant pensions 
to Union army veterans at least sixty-five years of  age on the basis of  age 
alone, unless the veteran was “unusually vigorous.” The 1910 Massachusetts 
Commission on Old Age Pensions defined the old as those sixty-five or older 
because “the age of 65 is the one fixed as the pensionable age in most [pension] 
schemes” (p. 15). In  1920 post office letter carriers and clerks became eligible 
for civil service retirement benefits at age sixty-five. Many of the state old-age 
pension laws that had been established by  1933 had a pension age of sixty- 
five. Railroad retirements were also set at age sixty-five in 1934. 
Calling all men sixty-five years of  age or older old should not be taken as 
an indicator that, once a man reaches age sixty-five, he becomes useless in the 
labor force. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the twentieth century, aging was 
associated with a loss of productivity. Several early twentieth-century scientific 
studies found that people’s mental capacities declined after age sixty, attribut- 
ing the decline to the pathological disorders that accompanied old age (Achen- 
baum  1978, 46). William Ostler, a professor of  medicine at Johns Hopkins, 
argued in  1905 that all men should retire at age sixty because by  then they 
had lost all mental elasticity. He was not alone in his arguments. The English 
economist William Beveridge argued in 1909 that older workers lacked adapt- 
ability, a quality necessary in a time of rapid technological change. The statisti- 
cian Frederick Hoffman wrote in a 1906 article that, given the relation between 
health and age, a nation could maximize its productive potential by  having 
work begin at age fifteen and end at age sixty-five (see Graebner 1980,29). At 
all other ages, productivity and therefore wages were low. In  1907 Congress 
declared Union army veterans who had reached age sixty-two to be half disa- 
bled and therefore entitled to pensions on the basis of  age. Isaac Rubinow 
wrote in  1916, “Age 65 is generally set as the threshold of old age since it is at 
this period of life that the rates for sickness and death begin to show a marked 
increase over those of the earlier years” (p. 14). When the federal government 
argued for the constitutionality of the first Railroad Retirement Act before the 
Supreme Court, one of its arguments was, “It is a commonplace fact that physi- 
cal ability, mental alertness, and cooperativeness tend to fail after a man is 65” 
(quoted in Graebner 1980, 160). 
Both recent and past data show that productivity does decline with age. Av- 
erage prices of male slaves in the American South peaked at age thirty-five, 
falling thereafter, suggesting that the difference between the income earned by 12  Chapter2 
a slave and the cost to the planter of maintaining him fell after age thirty-five 
(Fogel 1989,69). The decline of earnings with age observed among working- 
class households after age thirty-nine in the early 1890s and the late 1910s 
suggests that there was a deterioration in productivity with age (Haber and 
Gratton 1994,73). Among workers today productivity declines with age (Kot- 
likoff 1988). However, productivity has never declined sharply at any particu- 
lar age. The decline has always been continuous. In fact, the net earnings of 
slaves were positive until they reached their late seventies, suggesting that the 
old were far from redundant in the labor force (Fogel 1989,53). Thus, it is not 
that age sixty-five marks a discrete decrease in mental and physical abilities. 
But, because many policy makers believed that it did, it became codified in the 
Social Security Act and became a traditional age for retirement. 
When labor force participation rates are calculated by  single year of age, it 
is evident that work life is being increasingly compressed. Participation rates 
have fallen at younger ages because of the growth in schooling. They have also 
fallen at all older ages. The average decline in labor force participation rates 
of men older than sixty-four therefore does not arise from changes in the age 
composition of  the  population. Participation rates between  ages  sixty and 
sixty-five have fallen sharply since 1900 (see fig. 2.5). In 1880, 96 percent of 
all sixty-year-olds and 90 percent of all sixty-five-year-olds were still in the 
labor force, but, by  1940, the figures had fallen to 81 and 68 percent and, by 
1990, to 66 and 39 percent, respectively. The decline in participation rates at 
older ages has been even greater. Eighty-one percent of all seventy-year-olds 
were still in the labor force in 1880, but only 22 percent were in 1990. Thus, 
it is not the aging of  the population that has caused declines in labor force 
participation rates at older ages. Participation rates have been falling at all ages 
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Fig. 2.5  Labor force participation rates of men aged eighteen to eighty-five  by 
age, 1880-1990 
Note: Participation rates were calculated using the concept of  gainful employment. All years were 
smoothed using Cleveland's lowess running line smoother with a band width of 0.2. 13  The Evolution of Retirement 
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above sixty-five. In fact, Bowen and Finegan (1969) estimated that the sharp 
rise in the elderly population above age seventy-five between 1948 and 1965 
caused participation rates of those age sixty-five and older to decline by only 
0.8 percent. More recently, participation rates have fallen for those age fifty to 
fifty-nine, with half the decline in participation rates at age fifty-five occurring 
between 1960 and 1990. In contrast, only one-third of the decline in labor force 
participation rates at age seventy occurred between 1960 and 1990. 
Figure 2.5 does not give us the clearest picture of how the timing of retire- 
ment over the life cycle has changed. To  determine changes in the timing of 
retirement, we must estimate the probability that a man retires at a particular 
age given that he has reached that age without having yet retired. This probabil- 
ity is often called the hazard rate and can be calculated from estimates of labor 
force participation rates at every single age. A high hazard rate at a given age 
indicates that a large fraction of men are likely to retire at that age. 
Figure 2.6 plots hazard rates by age for the census years 1900-20,  1940-60, 
1900-20 
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Fig. 2.6  Probability of retirement at single age given that have reached that age 
without having yet retired (hazard rate) under different labor force definitions, 
men aged thirty-five to seventy-five, 1900-1990 
Note: Participation rates were averaged over the census years 1900-1920, 1940-60,  and 1970-90. 
The smoothed hazard was estimated using Cleveland’s lowess running line smoother with a band 
width of 0.2. 14  Chapter2 
and 1970-90.  Between 1900 and 1920, the probability of retirement at older 
ages rose fairly continuously, and no single age demarcated the shift to retire- 
ment. But, when Social Security was instituted in 1935, men became eligible 
for benefits at age sixty-five. The use of sixty-five as a retirement age for Social 
Security also led to its adoption as a retirement age, often mandatory, by many 
private pension plans. By  1940-60  there was a pronounced  increase in the 
probability  of  age-sixty-five  retirements,  and this probability  increased  be- 
tween  1940-60  and  1970-90.  A spike in age-sixty-two retirements first be- 
comes  evident  after  1960. In  1961 Congress  amended  the  Social  Security 
program  to  permit  retirement  at  age sixty-two  with  reduced  benefits.  Age 
sixty-two  is also a common  early retirement  age in private  pension  plans. 
When hazard rates are estimated by single census year, the spike at age sixty- 
two is much sharper in 1990 than in previous census years, overtaking that at 
age sixty-five. A small spike at age fifty-five, the age at which many private 
pension plans allow benefits for less than actuarial reductions, first becomes 
evident in 1990. 
Thus, although the retirement age was always higher for men in their sixties, 
it was only after the introduction of  Social Security that sixty-five (and later 
sixty-two) became the dominant retirement age. The existence of a dominant 
retirement age does not imply that health and productivity deteriorate rapidly 
after a fixed period. Rather, it suggests that the timing of retirement is deter- 
mined by economic considerations and perhaps by custom as well. 
2.3  Explanations 
Retirement requires the individual to have accumulated assets to maintain 
consumption. By postponing the age of retirement, workers are able to enjoy 
a higher level of consumption both  before and after retirement. The steady 
withdrawal of workers from the labor force at younger ages suggests either that 
the retirement income available to workers has increased or that workers are 
increasingly being forced out of the labor force only to face impoverishment 
in  old age. The belief  that the elderly were in  need of  assistance was pro- 
pounded by the Social Security Board, which in 1935 argued that “the major 
part of  the industrial population earns . . .  scarcely enough to provide for its 
existence,” leading industrial workers to “reach old age with few resources” 
(Shearon  1938, 3, 33). According to the Social Security Board, older workers 
were forced out of the labor force because modern  industry had no use for 
them. Recent research has placed more emphasis on the increase in retirement 
income. This section examines both factors that have pulled workers out of the 
labor force and factors that have pushed them out. 
2.3.1  Rising Retirement Income 
Among the most popular explanations for the rise of retirement is that indi- 
viduals can afford it. Rather than retiring because they are debilitated, they are 15  The Evolution of Retirement 
- 
retiring to enjoy leisure. If this explanation is true, then it is likely that more 
individuals are approaching old age with the wealth to support a comfortable 
retirement. 
One way to assess trends in the economic well-being of the aged is to exam- 
ine trends in home ownership. Information on home ownership is available 
from both early and recent censuses, whereas income information is available 
only in more recent censuses. Although information on home ownership is 
imperfect (because the census does not indicate which household member 
owned the home), attributing ownership to the household head is a reasonable 
assumption. Chapter 6 shows that the wealthier, who were more likely to own 
their own homes, were less likely to reside with family members. Figure 2.7 
therefore plots the percentage of men age sixty-five or older owning their own 
homes by retirement status. Overall, the rate of home ownership declined from 
1900 to 1920, largely because of movement out of agriculture, and rose from 
1940 to  1990. But, among the retired, home ownership increased between 
1900 and 1910, leveled off between 1910 and 1940, and then started to rise. 
The difference between home-ownership rates among the retired and those still 
in the labor force narrowed between 1900 and 1990 until, by  1990, there was 
virtually no difference. The narrowing of home-ownership differentials by re- 
tirement status suggests that the retired have increasingly been able to maintain 
the consumption levels enjoyed by those still in the labor force. 
Although most early censuses did not provide wealth or income information, 
the censuses of 1850, 1860, and 1870  provided information on either real estate 
wealth, personal assets, or both. These censuses show that the old were much 
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Fig. 2.7  Home ownership (percentage) among men aged sixty-five or older, by 
retirement status, 1900-1990 
Note:  Home ownership was imputed to the household head. Retirement status was calculated un- 
der the concept of gainful employment. The sample includes the institutionalized, who by defini- 
tion are not home owners. Calculated from the integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles and 
Sobek 1995). 16  Chapter2 
wealthier than  the young  and were becoming more so. Free males in  1850 
older than sixty-nine were not as rich in real estate as men in their late fifties, 
but they still held real estate worth ten times that of men aged twenty to twenty- 
nine. Taking both real estate and personal wealth into account, men aged sixty- 
five and over in  1870 were much wealthier than any other age group (Haber 
and Gratton 1994, 71). 
Additional evidence can be garnered from the early Consumer Expenditure 
Surveys of urban middle- and upper-working-class families still participating 
in the labor force. In both the Consumer Expenditure Surveys of  1889-90  and 
19  17-19,  there is evidence that families were accumulating modest surpluses 
at all ages. Although the earnings of the male household head fell rapidly with 
age, the earnings of children allowed the family to maintain surpluses. Haber 
and  Gratton  (1994,  78) found  that  summing  median  savings  between  age 
twenty-five  and  age sixty-five yielded  assets, in  1918 dollars, of  $1,745  in 
1888-90  and $3,015 in 1917-19.  Mean surpluses yielded about $5,000 in each 
survey, suggesting that the  typical  household could expect to save between 
$2,500 and $5,000 in assets by the time the head of the household reached age 
sixty-five. The range in the general population is likely to be greater. The early 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys did not survey the unemployed, the retired, the 
young, and the dependent elderly. They surveyed very few professionals. The 
population mean may be greater and the median lower. Nonetheless, estimates 
from these surveys are upheld by studies of the wealth of older people in indus- 
trial states in the mid-l920s, in which about 40 percent of the elderly reported 
wealth of $4,245 or more. 
By annuitizing wealth, Haber and Gratton (1994,79) provide a rough assess- 
ment of trends in the economic well-being of elderly couples from 1870 to the 
mid-1 920s. They find that mean wealth in  1870 implies that about 20 percent 
of men age sixty-five and over could have financed a ten-year annuity of $23 1 
in 19  17 dollars. The 19  17-1  9 Consumer Expenditure Survey and studies from 
the  1920s therefore indicate that, by  the late  1910s and early  1920s, 40-50 
percent of men could finance a ten-year annuity of  $616 in 1917 dollars. 
Today, the median nonhousing wealth of households with heads aged sixty 
to sixty-five is $19,19 1 in 19 17 dollars.' Since the median wealth of an elderly 
couple was  about  $3,000 in  1917, the  assets  of  the elderly have  risen  over 
sixfold, an  increase greater than  that in  GNP since  1917. Furthermore, the 
composition of these assets has changed. Among households with heads aged 
sixty-five to sixty-nine in  1991 the median  of  Social Security  and pension 
wealth combined was $1 15,200, whereas the median of liquid financial assets 
was only $14,000 (Poterba, Venti, and Wise  1994). In  the past retirees were 
largely dependent on their own savings and on their families for support. Pri- 
vate pensions were rare, and old-age assistance programs had not yet been in- 
stituted. 
The first private pension plan was founded by American Express in  1875, 
but growth in pensions was slow. Only twelve private pensions existed in  1900. 17  The Evolution of Retirement 
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The plans were typically noncontributory, paid out only very small sums of 
money, and could be withdrawn at any time at the discretion of the employer.* 
The federal government had no regular retirement or pension system for its 
employees until 1920. In the 1920s, changes in state laws led to the growth of 
contributory plans with mandatory deductions. By 1930, 2.7  million employ- 
ees, about 10 percent of all private wage and salary workers, were covered by 
retirement plans. The tax incentives incorporated in the Revenue Act of  1942 
assisted the expansion of pension plans after World War 11,  and 41 percent of 
all private wage and salary workers were covered by  1960, almost 50 percent 
by the mid-1980s (see fig. 2.8). 
For the median elderly household today, Social Security, not pension pay- 
ments, constitutes the major portion of  income. The first state-provided old- 
age pensions were instituted in Arizona and Alaska in 1915.3  Similar programs 
were enacted in Montana, Nevada, and Pennsylvania by  1923, and by  1929 
pension programs were in place in Wisconsin, Kentucky, Washington, Colo- 
rado, Maryland, California, Utah, Minnesota, and New York. By  the end of 
1934 there were old-age pension laws in twenty-eight states, plus Alaska and 
Hawaii. These state programs were limited in scope. States did not necessarily 
make their programs mandatory. In many states, the pensionable age was sev- 
enty, and pensions were restricted to the very poor who did not have financially 
responsible relatives. In addition, pensions were given only to those who had 
resided within the state for a period of, generally, fifteen years, that is, a long 
time. 
As first instituted in 1935, Social Security contained two programs provid- 
ing assistance to the elderly. One was Old Age Insurance, which in 1939 be-  -  55 4 
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Fig. 2.8  Percentage of private wage and salary workers covered by pension 
plans, 1930-87 
Nore: Compiled from Series H 287-304 in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975,353)  and table 4.1 in 
Beller and Lawrence (1992,75). 18  Chapter2 
came Old Age and Survivors Insurance. The other was Old Age Assistance, 
which was a joint federal-state venture with the federal government matching 
state expenditures on a one-to-one basis up to a specified maximum per recipi- 
ent. By 1940, all states had a program, and 22 percent of all individuals sixty- 
five and older were receiving benefits. Old Age Assistance remained the major 
income program supporting the elderly until 1950.4 
The Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance program was initially 
small and inc~nsequential.~  One-time lump-sum benefits were paid in  1937, 
but it was not until 1940 that monthly benefits first became payable. The pro- 
gram remained small until 1950, when coverage was extended to an additional 
10 million persons, eligibility conditions were liberalized, and benefits were 
increased by  77 percent. The liberalization continued throughout the  1950s 
with increases in benefits, the expansion of coverage to farmers, farm laborers, 
domestic workers, and the self-employed, and the provision of monthly bene- 
fits to disabled workers aged fifty to sixty-four. The liberalization of qualifying 
rules for disability benefits and the increasing generosity of these benefits may 
be partially responsible for declines in labor force participation rates among 
workers aged fifty to sixty-four. In 1961 men were permitted to retire at sixty- 
two with reduced benefits, and in 1965 hospital insurance was provided to men 
sixty-five and over. Between 1968 and 1973 benefits were increased in every 
single year. Retrenchment did not come until  1977, when the indexation for- 
mula for benefits that produced  an overadjustment was corrected, and until 
the 1980s, in the form of delays in cost-of-living adjustments, taxing half the 
benefits of upper-income recipients, and changes in the age of retirement for 
twenty-first-century retirees. 
Most individuals today finance their retirement primarily through the Social 
Security  system. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994) find that,  for those aged 
sixty-five to sixty-nine in 199  1, median Social Security wealth was three times 
as large as financial assets and employer-provided pensions combined. Hurd 
(1994) finds that, in 1986, 81 percent of elderly households received over half 
their income from Social Security, with 40 percent having no income from 
assets and 74 percent no income from private pensions or annuities. In 1987 
Social Security was the only source of income for 14 percent of beneficiaries 
(Sherman 1989,6). This need not be so. The elderly could finance their retire- 
ment through employer-provided pensions or private savings. Ultimately, what 
determines the amount of  money available for retirement is income. The rise 
of  private and government pensions, Social Security, and private savings re- 
flects the growth of incomes. Those with higher incomes are better able to save 
and still maintain a high consumption standard while working. Pension and, to 
a lesser extent, Social Security benefits are determined by past wages. Individ- 
uals may simply have substituted away from other forms of savings (see, e.g., 
Ippolito 1986). After all, why keep money in a savings vehicle whose earnings 
are subject to taxation? But the form that workers’ savings take does matter 
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doubtedly made savings more convenient and efficient and provided tax incen- 
tives for saving for old age. The first cohorts to collect Social Security benefits 
received unexpected retirement windfalls. In addition, both Social Security 
and most private pension plans incorporate substantial financial incentives to 
retire early. The incentives provided by firm pension plans are far greater than 
those provided by Social Security benefits. Workers who retire later do so un- 
der less advantageous conditions. In fact, the empirical estimates discussed 
below suggest that the magnitude of the effect of a dollar in private pension 
wealth is very different from that of a dollar in Social Security wealth, which 
in turn is very different from that of a dollar in asset holdings. 
The financial incentives toward retirement incorporated in Social Security 
and private pension plans come in two forms. The wealth provided by  Social 
Security and private pension plans encourages more retirement. But how bene- 
fits accumulate matters. Under Social Security, workers who retire after sixty- 
five do not receive an actuarially fair increase in benefits to account for the 
reduction in the number of years that they will be collecting benefits. Because 
Social Security accrual is a small proportion of wage earnings for high-wage 
workers but a significant proportion for low-wage workers, the inducement to 
leave the labor force at age sixty-five is inversely related to wage earnings. 
Because higher-paid workers are more likely to be covered by private pension 
programs, they are more likely to be affected by  the work disincentives of 
private pension programs. The typical formulas used in determining firm pen- 
sion benefits encourage continued employment until a given age, generally 
between fifty-five and sixty, and then provide incentives to leave the firm be- 
cause the annual additions to retirement wealth are reduced or even negative. 
In most firms the addition to retirement wealth after age sixty-five is negative. 
Estimates of  the effect of  private pensions on labor supply are typically 
large. For example, Stock and Wise (1990) estimate that raising the early re- 
tirement age from fifty-five to sixty would reduce the number of employees 
who are retired by age sixty by 35 percent:  Nonetheless, there is considerable 
disagreement about the overall effect of pensions on retirement trends. Ander- 
son, Gustman, and Steinmeier (1997) attribute about a quarter of  the trend 
toward earlier retirement by men in their early sixties from 1970 to the mid- 
1980s to the combined effects of private pensions and Social Security. One 
problem in trying to identify the effect of pensions is that nationally represen- 
tative data cannot be used to draw inferences about labor supply behavior be- 
cause they lack detailed pension plan information. But firm data tell us only 
whether a worker leaves the firm, not whether he withdraws from the labor 
force. An additional difficulty is that, if firms shape pensions to suit the tastes 
of workers, researchers may overestimate the effect of pension incentives on 
retirement. Finally, models that incorporate pension accrual patterns into the 
retirement decision may incorrectly assume that the exact details of pension 
plans and the complex calculation of  accrual are fully understood by  both 
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The accrual patterns of private pensions that provide incentives to retire at 
specific ages cannot explain why so many  men retire at ages sixty-two and 
sixty-five. The economic inducements to retire at sixty-five, instead of  sixty- 
four or sixty-six, are relatively small (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1996). Pen- 
sion accrual patterns are an even less likely explanation for the increase in 
retirements at age sixty-two. Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) found that only 2 per- 
cent of the 988 pension plans that they surveyed exhibited any large change in 
pension accrual that would induce extra retirement at sixty-two. The availabil- 
ity of  Social Security benefits may explain why so many men retire at sixty- 
two. If  workers are liquidity constrained, they will retire only on becoming 
eligible to receive Social Security benefits. 
Estimates of the effect of Social Security on labor supply tend to be smaller 
than those of private pensions and suggest that the existence of Social Security 
is an inadequate explanation of  recent retirement trends. Hausman and Wise 
(1985) estimate that an extra $10,000 in Social Security wealth at ages sixty- 
two to sixty-four leads to only a 1.7 percent increase in the probability of retire- 
ment and  at ages sixty-five or older to about a 4.0 percent increase. They 
estimate that increases in Social Security benefits from  1969 to  1973 could 
account for at most one-third of the decrease in labor force participation rates 
among men aged sixty to sixty-four and less for men sixty-five years of age or 
older. Burtless (1  986) finds that these increases played an even smaller 
Moffitt (1987) estimates that the growth of Social Security accounted for only 
15 percent of  labor force participation reductions in the 1970s. Krueger and 
Pischke (1992) use time-series data to examine cohorts whose Social Security 
wealth was reduced because of the 1977 amendments to the Social Security 
Act. They find that Social Security wealth had only a small and statistically 
insignificant effect on the retirement rate. 
The labor force participation rates of men age sixty-five and over, as plotted 
in figure 2.2 above, provide no evidence that the institution of Social Security 
affected the trend in retirement. By the time Social Security began to pay 
monthly benefits in  1940, 58 percent of the total decline in male labor force 
participation rates from 1880 to  1990 had already occurred. No discernible 
effect of old-age insurance programs is seen in the participation rates of other 
countries either. In Britain the first means-tested old-age pensions were paid 
to people age seventy and over in 1909, but the British labor force participation 
rates plotted in figure 2.2 show no acceleration in trend. Beginning in  1928, 
contributory pensions were paid to workers over age sixty-five who had made 
the requisite number of contributions, but there was no retirement condition. 
It was not until the National Insurance Act of 1946 that workers were required 
to withdraw from full-time employment in order to qualify for benefits. But 
this date does not mark a deviation from the aggregate trend either. The devia- 
tion in trend in  the German series coincides with the financial crisis of  the 
Weimar Republic, not with changes in invalidity and old-age insurance. Al- 
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respectively, participation rates barely declined between  1882 and  1895. In 
France voluntary old-age insurance was instituted in 1895 and made compul- 
sory in 1910, but participation rates increased somewhat after 1910. 
Researchers have  found that increased assets also have  a small effect on 
retirement rates and, for an equal discounted present value of wealth, a smaller 
effect than Social Security. Hurd and Boskin (1984) find that, although workers 
in the highest asset quartile retire more frequently, variation in retirement prob- 
ability with assets is small. Hausman and Wise (1985) find that, on average, an 
extra $10,000 in liquid assets leads to only a 0.16 percent increase in the proba- 
bility of retirement. Diamond and Hausman (1984) find that, on average, an 
extra $1,000 in wealth reduces time until retirement by 6 percent, whereas an 
extra $1,000 in Social Security wealth reduces time until retirement by  about 
15 percent. The observed effect of assets on retirement may be relatively small 
because, in contrast to Social Security wealth, assets holdings are more likely 
to be accurately predicted by individuals. That many Social Security increases 
were unexpected may have induced more retirements. Alternatively, assets may 
have little effect on the labor force participation decision because asset hold- 
ings are relatively small. A survey by Memll Lynch (“Employees Need to Save 
More Money for Retirement” 1994) reported that only 61 percent of preretirees 
had savings and investments apart from an employer-sponsored pension plan. 
The empirical evidence on the role of  rising retirement income has been 
mixed. One problem has been that most research on the subject has used cross- 
sectional data for the period after the 1960s even though the labor force partici- 
pation rates of older men have been declining since 1880. For men age sixty- 
five and over, 70 percent of the decline in participation rates occurred before 
1960. If  we  are to understand  the long-term trend, we  cannot apply cross- 
sectional estimates from the period after the 196Os, when retirement rates were 
already high, to the past. In chapter 3 I therefore use data from 1900 and 1910 
on Union army veterans receiving Union army pensions, data that allow me to 
examine the effect of the first major pension program in the United States. 
In chapter 3 I argue that, at the beginning of the century, increased wealth 
had a substantial effect on retirement. This implies that rising incomes could 
account for much of the rise in retirement since 1880. But increasing incomes 
cannot be the only explanation. In chapter 3 I also show that the responsiveness 
of retirement to  income has decreased, suggesting that the role of other fac- 
tors-such  as declining health, sectoral shifts in the economy, technological 
change, or an increased demand for retirement because it has become relatively 
more attractive and inexpensive-must  be investigated. 
2.3.2  hshing Out the Old 
The notion that older men were pushed out of the labor force by such factors 
as declining health, increased unemployment, sectoral shifts in the economy, 
and technological change has a long history. Early twentieth-century writers 
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older men out of the labor force. Machinery was increasingly operated at such 
fast speeds that older workers could not keep pace and were relegated to the 
“industrial scrap heap.” They were condemned to be casual laborers or county 
charges because no firm would hire them. A manager interviewed by the Lynds 
in their study of Middletown in 1924 claimed that “in production work 40 to 
45 is the age limit because of the speed needed in work” (Lynd and Lynd 1929, 
33). The U.S.  Committee on Economic  Security  (1935) justified  the Social 
Security Act on the grounds that a worker’s “advanced age or invalidity renders 
him incapable of an effective part in productive enterprise” (p. 137). The tech- 
nological explanation persisted into later decades, becoming prominent in the 
writing of gerontologists in the 1960s. 
But behind the indictment of technology lies the myth of a rural American 
past in which workers could labor into old age because there were always jobs 
for old men on farms or in leisurely self-employment. The Lynds described the 
older, rural world as one “where the physical decline is gradual and even the 
very old are useful,” contrasting it with the rapid  and abrupt superannuation 
faced by industrial workers (Lynd and Lynd 1929, 35). This appeal to a pasto- 
ral, rural past was echoed by Supreme Court Justice Cardozo when he upheld 
the constitutionality of Social Security in 1937, arguing that the number of the 
aged “unable to take care of themselves is growing at a threatening pace. More 
and more of our population is becoming urban and industrial instead of rural 
and agricultural.”* 
Trends in labor force participation rates arrayed by  extent of  urbanization 
belie the view that the experience of the elderly in urban areas represented a 
dramatic departure from that of the elderly in rural areas. Figure 2.9 plots labor 
force participation rates for men age sixty-five or older by farm residence, resi- 
dence in a rural area but not on a farm (an unincorporated area or an incorpo- 
rated area of fewer than twenty-five hundred people), residence in an urban 
area (an incorporated area of  twenty-five hundred or more), and residence in a 
metropolitan area (either an area with a large agricultural population or an area 
integrated with a central city). These areas would differ not just in the extent 
of agricultural employment but also in the degree of self-employment. In 1910, 
24 percent  of  older workers not  living on a farm but  living in a rural  area 
were self-employed, as opposed to 19 percent in urban areas and 17 percent in 
metropolitan areas. 
Labor force participation rates were falling for all men after 1880 regardless 
of residence, as figure 2.9 shows. Although the  1880-1940  decline was espe- 
cially pronounced in metropolitan areas, there were declines in rural areas and 
among farm residents as well. When an aggregate participation rate is calcu- 
lated for both farm residents and rural, nonfarm residents, this overall partici- 
pation rate is higher than that observed in urban areas. The early social reform- 
ers’ idealized view of rural employment might explain the difference in levels, 
but it cannot explain the trend common to both rural and urban areas. 
One further aspect of the data presented in figure 2.9 must be mentioned. It 23  The Evolution of Retirement 
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Fig. 2.9  Labor force participation rates for men aged sixty-five and over, by 
extent of urbanization, 1850-1990 
Nore: A rural area is defined as an unincorporated area or an incorporated area of  fewer than 2,500 
people, whereas an urban area is defined as an incorporated area of 2,500 or more people. After 
1940 the definition of  metropolitan areas varies slightly from year to year but basically covers 
areas with either large nonagricultural populations or areas integrated with a central city. Estimates 
of  participation rates in rural, nonfarm, and urban areas are based on the current definition of the 
labor force from published census volumes and have been adjusted to account for differences in 
participation rates under the current definition and under the concept of gainful employment. All 
other labor force participation rates were estimated from the integrated public-use census samples 
(Ruggles and Sobek 1995) using the concept of  gainful employment. 
appears that men living on farms had remarkably high labor force participation 
rates-87  percent in  1880 and 62 percent in  1940, compared to those of non- 
farm men of 66 and 37 percent, respectively. Fifty percent of men age sixty- 
five and over were living on a farm in 1880, but by  1940 the proportion had 
fallen to 22 percent. Had the percentage of older men remained 50 percent in 
1940, overall participation rates would have fallen by only 24 percent instead 
of 43 percent. This type of calculation has led researchers to argue that the fall 
in the participation rates of the elderly prior to 1940 was largely driven by the 
decline of farming. Farmers, however, were actually no less likely to retire than 
nonfarmers. Because they often retired by leaving their farms, the data cannot 
be used in this manner. This point will be taken up again in chapter 5. 
Older men may have been pushed out of the labor force because, once they 
became unemployed, firms may have been unlikely to hire them. Wentworth 
(1945) reported that over half the individuals surveyed between 1941 and 1942 
cited being  laid off  as their reason for retirement. The U.S. Committee on 
Economic Security (1935, 146) noted: “Once unemployed, older workers tend 
to have great difficulty in finding reemployment and their chances of reabsorp- 
tion become less and less with advancing age.” Slichter (1919, 155) wrote that 
“the loss of his job by a semi-skilled worker over 40 or 50 is likely to mean a 24  Chapter2 
permanent reduction in his earnings capacity, for he will have great difficulty 
in obtaining a job as good as his previous one.” In the 1920s many firms began 
to prohibit or restrict the hire of new workers older than forty-five or fifty. In 
his ruling  on Social Security Supreme Court  Justice Cardozo cited a study 
reporting that, in  1930, “out of  224 American factories investigated,  71, or 
almost one third, had fixed maximum hiring age limits; in four plants the limit 
was under 40; in 41 it was under 46. In the other 153  plants there were no fixed 
limits, but in practice few were hired if they were over 50 years of age.” A firm 
that needs to train its workers would much rather train a younger worker than 
an older worker because it can recoup its investment costs over many years. 
Younger workers had the advantage of physical strength at a time when many 
jobs were dangerous and physically  exhausting. They also had an additional 
advantage. The rapid advances in high school education in the  1920s meant 
that younger workers had a much better general training. 
The difficulties faced by  older workers can be seen in the  1900 and  1910 
census data. Margo (1993), for example, finds that the probability of long-term 
unemployment rose with age and that, the older a worker was when he became 
unemployed, the more likely he was to retire subsequently. A worker’s proba- 
bility of entering unemployment did not increase with age, but his probability 
of leaving unemployment  declined with age. Lee (1996) finds that long-term 
unemployment in 1900 or 1910 greatly increased the odds of retirement within 
the next ten years. The difficulties faced by older workers may be even greater 
today because the probability that an unemployed worker will leave unemploy- 
ment has decreased since 1910. In chapter 5 I examine the effect of increases 
in unemployment  spells on retirement rates and investigate  why unemploy- 
ment spells have  increased, concluding that the probability  of  leaving unem- 
ployment may have fallen because better income prospects now enable work- 
ers to reject the first job that becomes available, not because finding a new job 
has become increasingly difficult. Long-term unemployment could be a causal 
factor behind  increasing  retirement rates,  but only if  workers  can afford  to 
reject the first job that becomes available. Once unemployed,  older workers 
will retire on not being able to find a satisfactory job, if they can afford to. 
When firms adopted pension  plans, many also adopted mandatory retire- 
ment provisions. One reason employers might want to impose mandatory  re- 
tirement on their workers is if they offered wages tied to seniority rather than 
marginal product (Lazear 1979). Although such a wage structure would reduce 
turnover, it would lead younger workers to be paid less and older workers more 
than their marginal product. Compulsory retirement would allow firms to re- 
move more expensive older workers and to offer younger workers incentives, 
in the form of promotions, to remain with the firm. The outlawing of manda- 
tory retirement before age seventy by  the  1978 Age Discrimination Act has 
allowed researchers to assess the effect of  mandatory retirement  (e.g., Burk- 
hauser and Quinn  1983). On the whole, the effects of mandatory  retirement 25  The Evolution of  Retirement 
appear to have been small, perhaps because it has been intertwined with finan- 
cial incentives to retire and these have remained in place. 
Another factor that pushes older men out of the labor force is poor health. 
One-third of the retirees studied by Wentworth (1945) between 1941 and 1942 
stated that they had retired because of illness or failing health. Older men today 
still commonly cite poor health as one of their main reasons for withdrawing 
from the labor force. Recent data indicate that health plays an important role 
in retirement deci~ions.~  Some researchers have pointed to increasing morbid- 
ity and disability rates as evidence that average health has worsened (e.g., Riley 
1989; Verbrugge 1984) and therefore has led to rising retirement rates. Ac- 
cording to this view, improvements in medical efficacy have led to an increased 
burden of chronic conditions by permitting the survival past age sixty-five of 
impaired individuals who in higher-mortality regimes would have died from 
acute diseases at earlier ages. I address the issue in chapter 4, in which I show 
that, not only has average health improved, but health has also become less, 
not more, important to the labor force participation decision. 
2.4  Development of a Retirement Lifestyle 
A man who retired in 1880 could expect a very different life from that of a 
man retiring today. In the past retirees were much more dependent on their 
families and friends for assistance. The 1919 Ohio Commission on Health In- 
surance and Old Age Pensions estimated that, in the cities of  Hamilton and 
Cincinnati, 15-25  percent of people over age fifty were dependent on relatives 
or friends (cited in Epstein 1928, 50),  a dependence necessitated by  the fact 
that, at the turn of the century, a time when incomes were low, a large segment 
of  the population had little in the form of  savings, the only other source of 
retirement income. For example, around 1900, roughly one-fifth of working- 
class households had  accumulated almost no financial savings (James, Pa- 
lumbo, and Thomas 1997). Surveys of the nondependent aged in the Northeast 
in the mid-1920s suggest that 20 percent had assets and property worth less 
than $850 in 1917 dollars (Gratton and Rotondo 1991), a sum that could cover 
about one year's worth of  a retired couple's  expenditures.'O Those who had 
accumulated more assets could not be assured that these were enough because 
either spouse might live longer than expected. 
Dependence on the family is evident in elderly living arrangements. One 
useful indicator of household authority and of dependence is whether elderly 
males were household heads. Although there was little change from 1880 to 
1940 in the probability that any man sixty-five years of age was the head of his 
household, there has been a steady increase since 1880 in the probability that 
a retired man was the head of  his own household (see fig. 2.10). In fact, 48 
percent of  the increase in retired men heading their own households occurred 
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Fig. 2.10  Percentage of noninstitutionalized  men aged sixty-five or older who 
were household heads, by retirement status 
Nure: Estimated from the integrated public-use census sample (Ruggles and Sobek  1995).  The 
basic pattern remains unchanged if the institutionalized are included. 
tirement status observed at the beginning of  the century suggest that, in the 
past, only men who worked retained their independence. Those who did not 
either remained in the same household, relinquishing their position of authority 
to their children, or moved into the households of their children. I discuss these 
patterns in more detail in chapter 6, showing that, while the elderly of the past 
would have preferred to maintain their own households, the majority simply 
did not have the necessary income. 
The elderly who retired were faced with a circumscribed choice, not just of 
living arrangements, but of activities as well. Old age, according to nineteenth- 
century essayists, was  to be a time of  rest and disengagement, serenity and 
peace (Fischer 1977, 122). Yeats imagined an elderly Maude Gonne as being 
“old and grey and full of sleep, And nodding by the fire.” Advice given to the 
elderly in a 1904 article published in the medical journal Practitioner was to 
“lead an absolutely quiet and uneventful life.” The old were to withdraw from 
all work, abandon all vigorous exercise, and prepare for the afterlife (Haber 
and Gratton 1994, 160-61). When Eleanor Roosevelt emphasized that the ma- 
jor benefit of Social Security would be to enable the elderly to remain in their 
own homes, she envisioned the old as resting in their chairs, content in familiar 
surroundings (see Graebner 1980, 200). She did not envision the large-scale 
development of retirement communities with residents putting to make par on 
a golf course. 
Sleepy inactivity could not have been the lot of  all the elderly. Local clubs 
founded by  and for older people sprang up in the 1930s (Achenbaum 1978, 
118). Retirement communities were already mushrooming in the  1920s and 
1930s. Florida, where initially only wealthy New  York  families had winter 27  The Evolution of  Retirement 
homes, had become accessible to the middle class by the 1910s, when a rail- 
road system was completed. It became accessible to an even larger segment 
of  the population after highways were built in the  1930s and ownership of 
automobiles became more widespread. Once highways were built, California 
also received a major infusion of elderly migrants. The first census that pro- 
vided information on migration in the past five years, that of  1940, showed 
that, between 1935 and 1940, the elderly were moving to the Pacific Coast and 
South Atlantic regions. This migration pattern has persisted to this day (Lon- 
gino 1990). Some of the elderly clearly were enjoying recreational activities 
during their retirement, but, compared with the period after World War 11,  this 
was a relatively small group of well-to-do individuals. Isaac Rubinow could 
ask rhetorically in 1934, “Where will you and I be at 65? Behind an imposing 
desk of an executive office, shaping destinies of other people, or in an institu- 
tion for mental disease? Clipping coupons while enjoying Florida in the winter 
and the Michigan lake in the summer, or in a comfortable old folks’ home, or 
less comfortable poorhouse?” (p. 243). A recreation-filled retirement was lim- 
ited to the fortunate few.” 
Since the 1950s, a much more positive view of retirement has emerged, far 
removed from early reformers’ conception of retirement as protection against 
the insecurities of an industrialized economy. Retirement is now viewed as a 
period of enjoyment and creative experience and as a reward for a lifetime of 
labor, increasingly shorter. Mass tourism, low-impact sports such as golf, and 
mass entertainment such as films, television, and spectator sports provide ac- 
tivities for the elderly at a low  price. Data from the mid-1980s show that, 
among men, the amount of time spent on recreational activities increases with 
age (see table 2.1). Work occupied 26 percent of the time of  twenty-five- to 
fifty-four-year-olds, 15 percent of the time of fifty-five- to sixty-four-year-olds, 
and 7 percent of the time of those older than sixty-four.  About half the decline 
in work time was absorbed by recreation, which accounted for only 19 percent 
of time use at ages twenty-five to fifty-four but 28 percent after age sixty-four. 
Table 2.1  Time Use in a 24-Hour  Day for Men in 1985 (%) 
Activity 
Age 
25-54  55-64  65 + 
Sleeping, including naps 
On job or commuting 
Recreation (including travel time) 
Eating, preparing food 
House cleaning, repair, gardening 
Personal care, care for others (travel time excluded) 


























Source: Calculated from Robinson (1993) 28  Chapter2 
The remaining half was spread over several activities, some of  which, such as 
leisurely meals, gardening, or certain forms of shopping, contain a recreational 
component. Increases in recreational activities with age are observed in other 
surveys as well. A 1978 survey of  1,031 retirees found that the retired sharply 
increased time spent on their favorite hobbies or recreational activities. The 
biggest increases were in active sports, general household repairs, gardening, 
and travel. Whereas only 13 percent of the sample claimed to have traveled 
frequently before retirement, 37 percent did so afterward (Morse and Gray 
As I argue in chapter 7, this new conception of retirement could not have 
been possible had it not been for increases in income, changes in technology, 
and the public provision of recreational goods. Rising income and technologi- 
cal change that has lowered the price of recreation has made recreational goods 
more affordable and thus increased access to them. The lower price and in- 
creased variety of recreational goods have made retirement much more attrac- 
tive than it was in the past. This, in turn, may have induced more retirement. 
An issue facing current generations is whether this new conception of retire- 
ment can continue to be the norm. The elderly have in part been able to finance 
retirement consumption by  taxing younger generations. But, by  2029, if  not 
sooner, the Social Security trust fund will be exhausted, and only payroll tax 
increases would maintain  current benefit levels. Clearly,  some reforms are 
needed. In chapter 8 I examine the history of old-age programs to determine 
what reforms are likely to produce a viable system, given that the political 
power of the elderly places demands for liberalization on old-age programs. 
1980,58-60). 
2.5  Summary 
This chapter has shown that the decline in labor force participation rates 
among older men has proceeded at a steady pace since 1880. The downward 
trend was evident among many different subgroups of  the population. Labor 
force participation rates fell among both white and black men, among both 
sixty-five- and seventy-five-year-olds, and among both rural and urban men. A 
review of explanations suggested that several factors could have contributed to 
the downward trend in labor force participation rates. After 1940 these factors 
included the provision of private pension plans and rising Social Security pay- 
ments, both of which led to sharp increases in retirement probabilities at spe- 
cific ages. Explanations for the decline prior to the establishment of  Social 
Security have focused on the shift from agriculture to manufacturing. Finally, 
reasons for the decline in labor force participation observed from 1880 to the 
present included the worsening average health of the elderly population and an 
increased demand for leisure arising from higher incomes and from the growth 
of  the entertainment and tourism industries. Although it was not possible to 
test competing explanations, the steady downward trend in labor force partici- 
pation rates suggests that long-term factors may be at work. 29  The Evolution of Retirement 
Appendix 2A 
Table 2A.1  Labor Force Participation Rates of Men Aged 65 or over and of Men 
Aged 55-64 
Age 65 +  Age 55-64 
Year  Gainful  Current  Gainful  Current 
1850  76.6  92.2 
1860  76.0 
I880  78.0  95.2 
1890  73.8 
1900  65.4  91.0 
1910  58.1  91.1 
1920  60.1  89.1 
1930  58.0 
1940  43.5  41.8  82.2  86.1 
1950  47.0  41.4  88.1  85.8 
1960  40.8  30.5  83.8  84.6 
1970  35.2  24.8  86.7  81.5 
1980  24.7  19.9  77.4  71.9 
1990  18.4  16.3  67.0  67.6 
Sources: See fig. 2.1. The series for men aged 65 or over calculated under the concept of gainful 
employment is Moen’s (1987) series extended backward to 1850 and forward to 1990 using the 
integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles and Sobek 1995). The series for men aged 65 or 
over based on the current definition of  the labor force is from Series D 29-41 in US.  Bureau of 
the Census (1975, 132) and from table 622 in US.  Bureau of the Census (1993). The series for 
men  aged 55-64  were estimated  from the integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles and 
Sobek 1995). 
Table 2A.2  Labor Force Participation Rates of Men Aged 65 and over, 
1850-1990,  United States, Britain, France, and Germany 
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Sources:  See fig. 2.2. Participation rates for the United States are from Moen (1987) extended 
backward to 1850 and forward to 1990 using the integrated public-use census samples (Ruggles 
and Sobek 1995). Participation rates for Great Britain are from Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling- 
Smee (1982). and those for France are from Marchand (1991). Those for Germany for 1925 and 
later are from Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein (1991) and for 1882, 1895, and 1907 are Conrad's (1990) 
estimates based on participation rates for men aged 60-69  and 70 or older. 
Table 2A.3  Labor Force Participation Rates of Men Aged 65 and over, by Race 
and Nativity 
White 
Year  All  Native Born  Foreign Born  Black 
1880  76.7  16.6  70.5 
1900  64.4  68.5  60.7 
1910  58.5  58.6  52.9 
1920  57.0  60.1  49.9 
1940  44.1  45.4  36.1 
1950  48.7  49.6  46.7 
1960  40.3  41.6  36.2 
1970  36.6  37.7  31.8 
I980  27.1  27.9  22.  I 











Sources: See figs. 2.3 and 2.4. Participation rates were calculated using the concept of gainful em- 
ployment. 31  The Evolution of Retirement 
Notes 
I. Median pension, Social Security, and liquid asset wealth was $123,400 in  1984 
2. The plans introduced by the railroads were typical. A worker received a pension 
3. For a review of state old-age pension programs, see Weaver (1982, 54-75). 
4. For studies of the effect of Old Age Assistance on the labor force participation 
rates of the elderly, see Friedberg (1996) and Parsons (1991). 
5. For a history of Social Security, see Berkowitz (1991). 
6. They examined only one firm. 
7. Most other studies also find that the effect of Social Security is small. An exception 
is Hurd and Boskin (1984), whose estimates lead them to attribute all the change in 
retirement rates between 1968 and 1973 to increases in Social Security. 
8. Helvering  v. Davis,  1937, reprinted in  National Conference on Social Welfare 
(1985, 129). 
9. For a review, see Quinn and Burkhauser (1990). 
10. Lee (1996) estimates that the needs of an elderly couple in  1917-19  were about 
$789 per year. 
11. A retirement spent in an institution was limited to the unfortunate few. Less than 
6 percent of  the U.S. population age sixty-five or older has ever been institutionalized. 
(Lumsdaine and Wise 1994). 
equal to 1 percent of his wage multiplied by his years of service. 